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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a corporation, A. ROBERT
COLLINS and GLADE N.
JAMES,

)
)

)
PlaintiffsAppellants,

)
Case No. 18327

vs.

)

EDWARD o. BAILEY and
RUTH C. BAILEY, his wife,

)

)
DefendantsRespondents.

)

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contract dispute.

At issue is whether

the acts of Plaintiffs-Apellants triggered an acceleration
clause in a contract which provides:
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights
under this contract or Buyer's interest in
said premises then and in that event the
Buyer must pay in full the outstandinq
balance due on this contract prior to said
transaction."
It is the position of Plaintiffs-Appellants that:
1.

C & J Industries is clearly identified as buyer

in the Uniform Real Estate contract; and
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2.

2 -

The only liability of Collins and James in

respect to the Uniform Real Estate contract is as guarantors;
and
3.

The sale of a portion of the real estate by Collins

and James as individuals did not trigger the acceleration clause.
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case was tried in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on remand from the Utah Supreme
Court.

The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, presided at the

hearing.
The case had been remanded by the Supreme Court
to determine the question of agency.
"It is apparent from the second
contract -- and the Baileys consistently point out -- that the buyer
under the first contract, C & J,
is not the seller under the second
contract. It is therefore necessary
to remand this matter for a determination of whether, in acting as
sellers under the second contract,
Collins and James were acting for
C & J." C & J Industries v. Bailey,
618 P.2d 58 (Ut. 1980).
After all exhibits had been admitted and all witnesses
had been examined, Judge Conder made a finding from the record
that C & J Industries was a de facto corporation at the time
of the second contract, and that if Collins and James were
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buyers under the original contract, then the question of agency
was not important (TR. 59, 60).

Judge Conder then requested

briefs on the· question he had put earlier as to whether the
signatures of Collins and James in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract made them "buyers" on that contract (TR. 58).

He

thus identified the issue he thought was decisive as, "Who
is it that is under contract here?" (TR. 59).

Both parties

submitted post-hearing memoranda in support of their respective
positions.
On March 17, 1982, judgment was entered for DefendantsRespondents holding that the Appellants, by their actions,
had triggered the acceleration clause of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower
court reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 13, 1978, Edwardo. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey,
as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with
C & J Industries, as buyer.

At the same time, a separate

document entitled "Guaranty" was executed between the Baileys
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and A. Robert Collins and Glade N. James who personally and
individually guaranteed performance of C & J Industries (Ex.
P-1,

~l).

The signature block on both documents appeared

as follows:
SELLER:
/s/ Edward O. Bailey
Edward o. Bailey
/s/ Ruth C. Bailey
Ruth c. Bailey
BUYER:
C & J INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED
By /s/ A. Robert Collins
/s/ A. Robert Collins
A. Robert Collins
/s/ Glade N. James
Glade N. James
On March 9, 1979, Collins and James sold a portion
of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Burgie.

Shortly thereafter,

the Baileys sent a document to C & J, Collins and James, the
gravamen of which was that the second contract, with Collins
and James as sellers, breached the terms of the first contract
in which C & J was the buyer.

Paragraph 3(a) of the first

contract provides:
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights
under this contract or Buyer's interest in
said premises then and in that event the
Buyer must pay in full the outstanding
balance due on this contract prior to
said transaction."
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Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking, among
other things, a declaration that C & J be permitted to continue
to make monthly payments under the contract as originally agreed
and that the facts of the case did not operate to accelerate all
future payments.

Appellants' motion for summary judgment was

granted and Respondent appealed to this Court which reversed
the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for determination of whether Collins and James as sellers in the second
contract were acting for C & J.
ARGUMENT
I

IF COLLINS AND JAMES WERE NOT BUYERS UNDER
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH THE
BAILEYS, OR IF COLLINS AND JAMES WERE NOT
ACTING AS AGENTS OF C & J INDUSTRIES
INCORPORATED WHEN THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO
A THIRD PARTY, THEN THE SALE OF A PORTION OF
THE REAL ESTATE TO THE BURGIES DID NOT TRIGGER
THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST CONTRACT.
Paragraph 3(a) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
with the Baileys provides for acceleration of the outstanding
contract balance if the Buyer "desires to sell or assian, transfer
or convey Buyer's rights under this contract."
There are two ways in which the transfer of a portion
of the property to the Burqies could have been done by the Buyer
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under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

First, if Collins and

James were principals to that contract, they would be considered buyers for the purpose of the acceleration clause.
Second, if Collins and James were acting as agents for C & J
Industries in making the sale, then the transfer would also be
by the buyer since the acts of the agents of a corporation are
the acts of the corporation.

Miller v. Arnal Corp., 632 P.2d

987 (Ariz.App., 1981).
II
THE EXECUTION OF CONTEMPORANEOUS INSTRUMENTS
OF CONTRACT AND GUARANTY SHOWS THAT THE
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND THAT COLLINS AND JAMES
WOULD BE BOUND AS PRINCIPALS TO THE UNIFORM
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH THE BAILEYS.
The trial court regarded the issue of who was a
party to the Uniform Real Estate Contract as decisive to the
case (TR. 58, 59, 60).

This issue arises because of the nature

of the signature block on the Uniform Real Estate Contract and
the Guaranty agreement (TR. 56, Ex. P-1).

This point had not

been briefed by counsel (TR. 57) and both submitted posttrial memoranda.
The issue of whether or not unqualified signatures
on a contract purportedly made by a corporation bind the signers
as principals to the contract has been frequently litigated.

The

cases cited in Respondents' post-trial memorandum are typical of
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those holding that the signers are principals to the contract.
Although the cases express similar circumstances, they are
clearly distinguishable on three points.

First, the corporation

was not identified in the body of the contract as buyer.

Second,

the signatures were all qualified by the off ice of the buyer as
a member of the corporation.

Finally, the personal possessive

"we", or some form indicating personal liability of the signers,
was the descriptive term used in describing liability in the
body of the contract.
In Taylor v. Reger, 48 N.E. 262 (Ind., 1897), the
promissory note read:
"Pendleton, Indiana, Aug. 31, '88. On
or before September, 1891, we promise to
~ to the order of Lorenzo D. Reger the
sum of Four Hundred Dollars, with six
per cent interest from date, payable
annually, and attorney's fees, value
received, without any relief from valuation
or appraisement laws.
"The Pendleton Glass Company
/s/ by B. F. Alman, President
c. B. Orvis, Vice Presidnet
Charles H. Roach, Secretary
A. B. Taylor
)
Benj. Rogers
) Directors
J. R. Boston
)"
(Emphasis added.)
The court determined the intent of the parties
from the instrument and held that the signers were individually
liable because the wording of the contract was "we promise
to pay".
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In Savings Bank v. Central Market, 54 P. 273,
(Cal. 1898), the contract was signed as "Central Market
Company" by its president, secretary, treasurer, and some
individual stockholders.

The stockholders argued that their

signatures appeared only as ratification of the contract
and were not intended to bind them individually for the
corporate debt.

The court again emphasized the wording

"we promise to pay" in holding the stockholders individually
liable on the contract.

The court went on to say that if

the body of the contract had said "the Central Market
Company promises to pay", then the signatures of the stockholders would have been meaningless.
Derman v. Brennaman, 149 P. 273 (Okla., 1915) also
involved a contract that read "we promise to pay".

In that

case, the court allowed parol evidence to determine the intent
of the parties to be bound as individuals.
A series of cases that is more directly on point
is annotated in 82 A.L.R.2d 435, and deals with unqualified
signatures accompanied by qualified signatures if there has
been a disclosure that dealings are with a corporation.

If

the contract listed the buyers as obligors in the plurality,
particularly with the use of the personal pronouns "we" or
"us", then the unqualified signer was held individually
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liable.

Caphart v. Dodd, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 584 (1868);

Whitney v. Sudduth, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 296 (1863); Wiwi v.
Tebbs, 24 N.E. 624 (Ohio, 1938).
"In the few cases holding defendants-signers
not personally liable on an instrument
containing a qualified signature as well as
defendants' unqualified ones, the name of the
corporation appeared in the body as the
promiser. The defendants-signers of a note
in Yowell v. Dodd, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 581 (1868)
were said to not be personally liable on the
note which stated 'the president and the
directors of the [company] will pay' and bore
the signature qualified by 'pres.' preceding
four unqualified signatures. Whether the
note bound defendants individually was a
question of intention to be determined from
what appeared on the face of the writing,
said the court, distinguishing other cases
involving similar notes in that here no
personal pronounds were used and no several
promises to pay appeared • • • • " (Emphasis
added.) 82 A.L.R.2d 436. (Note that Yowell
and Caphart were apparently in the court and
against the same defendant.)
The issue of an unqualified signature on a contract
was examined in Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 197 P.2d 167 (Cal., 1948).
The contract had a signature block as follows:
"The Feldheym Co., Inc.
/s/Dave Schwebel
Dave Schwebel"
The plaintiff argued that Schwebel was individually
liable for the contract.

The argument was that since "by" did

not appear before Schwebel's name, he must have been presumed to
be acting in an individual capacity.

The plaintiff relied on
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cases where nowhere in the contract the name of the principal
appeared and where the court held the signer individually liable.
The court in Carlesimo held those decisions inapplicable because
the plaintiff was on notice that a corporation was the principal
to the contract.

Paro! evidence was admitted to show that

Schwebel signed merely as an agent.
The preceding cases are authority for the proposition
tha~

where the contract on its face shows that only a corporation

was intended by the parties to be bound, unqualified signatures do
not individually bind the signers.

Paro! evidence has been allowed

to show intent of the parties when the intent was not clear from
the face of the contract.
The rules of interpretation that determine the intent
of the parites to contracts are clearly laid out in case law.
It is fundamental that the intent of the parties should first
be ascertained from the four corners of the instrument itself,
second from the other contemporaneous writings concerning the
same subject matter, and third from extrinsic evidence of the
intentions, if necessary.
306 P.2d 773 {1957).

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee,

Where two or more instruments are executed

by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times
in the course of the same transaction, and concern the same
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subject matter, they will be read and construed together so far
as determining respective rights and interests of the parties
even though one or both of the agreements do not ref er to each
other.

Bullfrog Marina, Inc., v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Ut, 1972).

In actions on contracts, the intentions of the parties are
controlling and normally these intentions will be found from
the instrument.

Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Ut., 1977).

Applying the principles of contract law to the
instant case and drawing on case law that determines the binding
effect of a signature on an individual, it must be concluded
that Collins and James are not principals to the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract clearly sets forth
in its body that the agreement is between the Baileys as sellers
and C & J Industries as buyer (Ex. P-1,

~l).

No argument can

be made that the Baileys did not know they were contracting
with a corporation.

Since the body of the contract did not

propose to bind anyone except C & J Industries, the unqualified
signatures of Collins and James are not binding on them as
individuals.

Carlesimo; Yowell; Central Market, supra.

Examination of the contemporaneous documents, the
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Guaranty reveals that
none of the parties intended that Collins and James be bound
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as principals to the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The intent

of the parties is controlling as to the binding effect of the
agreement.

Oberhansly, supra.

If the parties intended that

Collins and James were to be principals to the contract, then
there would be absolutely no need for execution of the Guaranty
agreement as any such agreement would be superfluous.

The very

terms of the Guaranty manifest the intent of the parties on the
Uniform Real Estate Contract.

C & J Industries is clearly

identified as the buyer in the Guaranty with Collins and James
to be held personally liable for its debts.

All references

to "Buyer" in the contract and the Guaranty refer solely to C & J
Industries.
The intent of the parties can clearly be ascertained
from the documents.

Where resolution of the controversy depends

on the meaning to be given documents, the trial court is in
no better position and is no better able to determine the meaning
of documents than is the Supreme Court; hence, as to such an issue,
the standard presumptions of credibility and verity to be accorded
the findings and judgments of the trial court do not apply.
Lake v. Hermise Associates, 552 P.2d 126 (Ut. 1976).
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III
THE GUARANTY EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES WAS
A VALID GUARANTY AGREEMENT AND CANNOT BE
READ OR INTERPRETED TO EXTEND THE LIABILITY
OF COLLINS AND JAMES TO BECOME PRINCIPALS
ON THE CONTEMPORANEOUS UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT.
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chisholm Bros. Farm
Equip. Co., 525 P.2d 976 )Id., 1974) defines guaranty as an
undertaking or promise that is collateral to the primary or
principal obligation and that bonds a guarantor to performance
in the event of non-performance by the principal obliger.
The guaranty by James and Collins was to,
" • • • be personally bound to guaranty the
performance of said corporation [C & J] in each
and every covenant and agreement under said
contract • • • in order that said Buyer [C & J]
may purchase said property, said A. Robert
Collins and Glade N. James desire to guaranty
the performance of said corporation."
Inasmuch as Collins and James promised, in writing,
to answer personally for the debts of C & J Industries, the
requisites of a guaranty have been met.
In their post-trial memorandum, Respondents claimed
that the last portion of the Guaranty created joint liability
for Collins and James with C & J, all as principals to the
contract.

Respondents relied on the final clause of the

Guaranty to support this conclusion:
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"Each and all of the parties to said
Uniform Real Estate Contract are jointly
and severally bound to perform the obligations, covenants and agreements of said
contract, said Edward o. Bailey and Ruth
c. Bailey, his wife, as Seller, and said
C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporation, as Buyer, and said A. Robert Collins
and Glade N. James, individually and
jointly."
This last clause again refers to C & J Industries
as "Buyer".

The reference to the joint and individual liability

refers to the liability that had just been created in the guaranty
agreement.

The guaranty of an individual is ·not to be extended

by implication beyond the express limits or terms of the instrument or its plain intent.
596 P.2d 100 {Ida., 1979).

Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca,
Any attempt to expand the obli-

gation of a guarantor to that of principal on the contract
he guarantees must be held to be improper.
Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc., v. Service
Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 {Ut., 1979), cited by Respondents
in their post-trial memorandum, does not support extension
of a guarantor's liability.

That case involved a security

agreement whereby inventory was assigned as collateral and in no
way was an actual personal guaranty involved.

Service argued

that the security agreement was in fact a guaranty and that
liability of a guarantor cannot be extended to make him a principal to the contract.

The court held that the agreement was not
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a guaranty because it was not a promise to answer personally
for the debts of another.

The court then went on to hold

that the security agreement was an admission of personal liability
on the original agreement.
IV
THE AGENCY QUESTION WAS NOT LITIGATED AND
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING ON THE THEORY THAT
COLLINS AND JAMES ACTED AS AGENTS OF C & J
INDUSTRIES IN SELLING A PORTION OF THE
PROPERTY ON THE CONTRACT TO BURGIE.
The words of Judge Conder at the end of the hearing
show that he felt the agency question was not decisive in the
case.
"Now, the evidence before me is that
both individuals assumed that they were
signing as though it was their personal
property. But there has been a dissolution and now in their hands, and not acting
as agents for the corporation. But, if
those same individuals are buyers under
Exhibit 1 and are, therefore, bound by
Paragraph 3A, it isn't going to make any
difference whether or not they were acting
as the agents on the sale of Exhibit 2, or
whether or not they were selling personally."
(R. 59, 60)
"That's the question really.
Wilkins who is raising that.
contract here?"
(R. 59)

That's Justice
Who is under

The court found that C & J Industries was a de facto
corporation at the time of the Burgie contract, and that as
a corporation could have signed the contract.

(R. 59)
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Finding of Fact No. 8 on Page 3, signed March 26,
1982, states:
"The court also finds that A. Robert
Collins and Glade N. James were in fact
buyers under the first contract, or in
the alternative, were acting as agents
for C & J Industries in the second
contract."
The standard of review in this court for pronouncements of the trial court is that they will only be upheld if
there is substantial, competent evidence supporting that pronouncement. Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Ut., 1981); Fisher
~Taylor,

572 P.2d 393 (Ut. 1977); Dalton v. Dalton, 307 P.2d

894 (Ut., 1975).
In determining whether or not agency relation
exists, the burden of proof is upon the person asserting
the relation.

Salt River Valley Water Assn. v. Giglio,

549 P.2d 162 (Ariz., 1976); Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Van's
Realty Co., 427 P.2d 284 (Ida., 1967); Bininger v. Judy,
398 P.2d 305 (Kan., 1965); First Nat. Bank of Twin Bridges
v. Sant, 506 P.2d 835 (Mont., 1973); Moss v. Vadman, 463
P.2d 159 (Wash., 1969).
existence of agency.

The law will not presume the

Aqee v. Gant, 412 P.2d 155 (Okla.,

1966); True v. High Plains Elevator Machinery, 577 P.2d
991 (Wyo., 1978).

The party asserting agency must show

its nature and extent.

Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla., 1963).
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In this court, the issue of the existence of agency was
examined in Wilkerson v. Stevens, 403 P.2d 31 (Ut., 1965).

The

issue in Wilkerson was whether or not a realtor was liable when
the real estate agent in his employ absconded with funds when the
realtor had no

listing agreement and knew nothing of the trans-

action. This Court said there was no agency relationship and
gave the following reasoning:
"From the facts recited, it will be seen
that there is no indication that the alleged
agent intended to be acting for the principal,
nor that the alleged principal had any such
intention with respect to such agent • • • • "
Wilkerson, supra.
In addressing the question of whether an officer of
a corporation acts as an agent for the corporation signing
the contract, this Court stated:
"Supporting of the testimony is the fact
noted above that there was a substantial
space left for the signature of the president of the corporation [to ratify the
contract] , presumably after appropriate
consideration and action thereon by its
board of directors. No officer or agent
of a corporation has anv authority to make
a contract to sell its real estate without
such action.
Foster v. Blake Heights Corp.,
530 P.2d 815, 818 (Ut., 1974).
(Emphasis
added. )
The issues of intent of the principal, C & J Industries, to have Collins and James act as agents through a resolution of the board of directors was never litigated.

The only

evidence in that regard was that Collins and James thought
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C & J Industries was defunct (R. 58).

This being the case,

there could be no intention on their part to act for C & J
as agents or to make a resolution as directors of C & J to take
corporate action.

Where the burden of proof rested on Baileys,

they have clearly failed to support any allegation of agency.
The only argument in this matter appears in their Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Defense and Counterclaim to the Allegations
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint that was filed with the court at its
request after the hearing. On Page 11, Point II 1(1), a summary
argument is made in favor of agency.

The argument assumes agency

from the fact that Collins and James were officers of C & J.
Such presumption is clearly not the law.

Agee, True, supra.

The trial court was clearly in error in finding
that there was an agency relationship because there is no
substantial evidence to support that conclusion; the issue
was not litigated; and Respondents failed in meeting the
burden of proof of that issue.
CONCLUSION
The provision of Paragraph 3A of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract between C & J Industries and the Baileys was
not triggered by the sale to the Burgies.

The intent of the

parties as manifest by the contemporaneous documents will not
support a conclusion that Collins and James were principals to
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the contract of sale.

There was no substantial evidence adduced

at trial that would support a finding that Collins and James
acted as agents of C & J Industries in entering into a contract
to sell part of the real property covered in the original contract.
Collins and James' liability as guarantors may not be extended to
make them principals on the contract they guaranteed.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully
petition this court to reverse the decision of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
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